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Abstract 
Unlike most OECD countries, Ireland has not yet developed full labour 
activation policy, but is under increasing pressure to do so. This paper explores 
why Irish labour activation policy and implementation stalled over the last 
three decades and the reasons for policy drift in this area. Framed by two 
crises, the paper maps the politics of Irish labour activation from the 1980s 
crisis up to the contemporary crisis. It first analyses the politics of labour 
activation by tracing shifts in political discourses about labour activation over 
the last three decades. It then draws on bottom-up implementation theory to 
examine the micro politics of implementation, referring briefly to 
implementation of supportive labour activation strategies in the 1990s and 
reviewing in more depth the National employment action plan in the 2000s. It 
then maps institutions, political debates and advocacy coalitions to assist in 
understanding the politics of Irish labour activation policy and how its 
implementation was shaped and stalled. This analysis of the institutional, 
ideational, political interests and international factors that shaped or 
postponed Irish movement from passive to active welfare administration helps 
us better understand contemporary issues concerning the relationship 
between political discourse about labour activation and its implementation. 
Keywords: Labour activation, Ireland, implementation, discourse, policy 
coalitions 
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Introduction 
Labour activation policy aims to make effective use of both welfare 
expenditure and a claimant's time on income support to maximise the 
possibility of return to paid employment. Ireland's level of labour 
activation is low relative to many OECD countries (Grubb et al., 2009; 
Martin, 2011). This paper explores why this is the case and why Irish 
labour activation policy has stalled relative to international 
experience. The paper is framed by two crises - the mid-1980s 
unemployment crisis and the late-2000s economic and unemployment 
crisis. Analysis of political discourse offers insight into how discourse 
of labour activation is used in times of crisis, how the various policy 
coalitions worked to progress or block different aspects of labour 
activation and how Irish policy is influenced by international policy 
actors and ideas. Drawing on implementation theory, the paper 
explores the micro politics of implementation and utilises concepts of 
policy drift, veto points and policy coalitions to account for stalled 
policy areas. The aim is to better understand contemporary issues 
concerning the relationship between political discourse about labour 
activation and its implementation. 
The first section defines what is meant by labour activation and 
reviews Irish labour activation relative to international experience. 
The second section introduces key theories. The next section then 
reviews the political discourse of labour activation over the last three 
decades. The following section examines the politics of 
implementation in Ireland and reviews implementation of supportive 
labour activation in the 1990s and, in particular, of the National 
employment action plan (NEAP) in the 2000s to examine how various 
factors interacted to shape or postpone Irish movement from passive 
to active welfare administration. The analysis section identifies 
institutional, ideational, political interests and international factors 
that influenced the development and type of labour activation policy 
in Ireland. The final section concludes and speculates about future 
politics of labour activation policy in Ireland. 
What is meant by labour activation policy? 
The language of labour activation is controversial. Some argue that 
the language implies a problematic level of inactivity and promotes a 
negative stereotype of welfare recipients. Others argue that a focus on 
'activating' people misses the point, that the real barrier to work is not 
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the behaviour of welfare recipients but the structural barriers they face 
in moving from welfare to work. Labour activation includes in its 
scope a broad range of approaches. These lie on a continuum from 
'full conditionality' or a sanctions-led workfare approach where no 
welfare is available without a work requirement to 'fully voluntary' 
where a wide range of supports are offered to a claimant and where 
the offer of support is not linked to income support (Dwyer, 2010). 
Barbier & Ludwig-Mayerhofer (2004) identify many types of labour 
activation, such as 'liberal' labour activation, which pushes people 
towards often low-paid work, limits the role of social policies and 
implies only modest efforts in training and skill enhancement, and 
'universalistic' activation, which stresses high standards of social 
protection and high-quality active labour market programmes 
(ALMPs), including training, skill development and decent 
employment. 
Where does Ireland stand on the continuum between 'high road' 
and 'low road' variants of labour activation? Interpretations of labour 
activation depend on the ideological predispositions of those in power 
(Barbier & Ludwig-Mayerhofer, 2004). The Department of Social 
Protection (DSP), with ultimate responsibility for implementing 
labour activation, defines it as 'a social contract where the claimant 
commits to engage with services in a process of active case 
management to develop and implement a personal progression plan 
and where failure to engage can lead to withdrawal of payment' (DSP, 
2011, p. 1).1 The National Economic and Social Council (NESC) 
stresses the objective of labour activation as ensuring 'that the 
payment of income supports to people who do not have a job_ is 
directly linked to the equally if not more important task of supportmg 
such people in their pursuit of employment and related opportunities 
and pursuing their life chances' (NESC, 2011, p. 3). 
While most agree that Ireland has made slow progress towards 
labour activation, there is less agreement as to what type of labour 
activation Ireland should adopt. Murphy (2010) distinguished three 
different models of labour activation: flexicurity, mutual obligations 
l For ease of reference unless mentioned for a specific purpose, the DSP is the name 
used for the department in all years. It was previously called the Department of Social 
Welfare, the Department of Social, Family and Community Affairs and the Department 
of Social and Family Affairs. The Department of Jobs, Enterprise and Innovation is the 
name used for the department previously known as the Department of Labour and the 
Department of Enterprise, Trade and Employment. 
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and active inclusion for all. The Danish model of flexicurity (derived 
from the two words flexibility and security) aims to enable flexible 
trans1t10ns between work and unemployment: periods of 
unemployment are cushioned by generous welfare schemes and 
workers, while unemployed, remain work-active by participating in 
ALMPs. The mutual obligations model promoted by the OECD 
(Grubb et al., 2009) recommends intensification of benefit-control 
activity for the unemployed and other benefit-recipient groups in a 
more coercive approach where moderate benefits are used to support 
compulsory education, training or labour market participation; 
intrinsic to this model is the political message it sends about the 
obligations of the unemployed. The third model, active inclusion for 
all, is promoted by the European Commission as a holistic strategy 
that stresses work for those who can work and inclusion for those who 
cannot work. This is less work focused and avoids punitive 
conditionality or a narrow focus on getting people off benefits. Rather, 
its three pillars focus on adequate income support, inclusive labour 
markets and decent public services, which strive to provide personal 
pathways to employment and/or social participation. 
The Irish approach to labour activation can be characterised by 
'inertia' (Martin, 2011). Failure to move from passive to active welfare 
administration has left systematic weaknesses in Irish capacity to 
respond to unemployment crises (NESC, 2011). Various evaluations 
find Irish ALMPs weak on delivery of labour market outcomes 
(Halpin & Hill, 2007; McGuiness eta!., 2011). The NESC (2011, Table 
3.2) used 2004-2007 data to show that Ireland spent 1.51 per cent of 
GDP on ALMPs and achieved a 4.1 per cent unemployment rate. This 
can be compared to low-spending New Zealand (0.77 per cent and 3.7 
per cent, respectively) and to high-spending Denmark (3.61 per cent 
and 4.5 per cent) or Belgium (3.42 per cent and 8.1 per cent). Given 
the little actual correlation between ALMP expenditure and 
unemployment outcomes, the issue is more about composition of 
expenditure. Ireland's composition is a 42:52 ratio between active and 
passive expenditure (the same as Denmark), while New Zealand 
strikes a healthier 50:50 ratio and Belgium a poor 33:67 ratio. Irish 
expenditure as a percentage of GDP is relatively low when compared 
to high-spending Nordic states but relatively high when measured per 
jobseeker. Ireland spends more on training and direct job creation 
than on employment incentives and labour market integration of 
people with reduced working capacity, a mix that does not deliver 
significant labour market progression. 
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I~ both nar~ow and broad meanings labour activation often implies 
makmg established welfare rights more conditional on jobseeking 
effor~s. (Cl~sen & Clegg, 2006, p. 527). It is in application of 
conditi_onabty that Ireland differs to many Anglo-Saxon and Nordic 
cou~tr~es. ~he NESC (2011) describes a light-touch approach with lax 
admi~IstratiVe controls. While in theory Irish policy applies a full 
sanction of total loss of payment for failure to take a reasonable labour 
activation offer, in practice this policy is not fully implemented. 
Contrary to the experience of many OECD countries, Ireland has not 
shifted as much towards 'conditional' forms of labour activation and 
has undergone less institutional restructuring than the UK or other 
liberal re?imes (Cousins, 2007). This paper asks why this is so, and the 
next section offers some theoretical tools to aid us in this task. 
Theory 
Various th~or~tical concepts can assist in this analysis. The politics of 
labour actlv~tron are processed within the broader Irish political 
culture, which has been characterised by policy inertia and 
incremental pragmatism. Hacker & Pierson (2010, p. 169) observe 
'p~licy .drift', where .vested interests have the power to let programmes 
dnft Without updatmg or renewal even when there is strong contrary 
~ress~:e and. evidence of policy failure. The NESC (2006, p. 14) 
rdentrfies an Implementation paralysis where strategic decisions are 
oft~n. d~layed ,or reversed. Molloy describes this 'implementation 
deficit disorder as a 'deeply embedded impulse established within the 
culture of es.tablished institutions' (Molloy, cited in Mulholland, 2010, 
p. 40). Reglmg & Watson (2010) draw attention to Irish veto points 
capable of asserting vested interests over public good, while Hardiman 
(2011, p. 6) reflects that a tendency to protect stakeholders limits 
e~fective institutional frameworks in policy implementation. Along 
With Boyle (2005) and Kirby & Murphy (2009), she offers FAS as an 
example of a political and administrative culture subject to veto 
players and vested interests. This political culture sets an important 
context for understanding how path-dependent policy is often 
constrained. 
. The politi~s of labour activation can be explored using bottom-up 
ImplementatiOn theory. This understands implementation as power 
pro~esses of 'micro politics involving negotiations and bargains where 
self mterested people play games' (Bardach, 1977, as cited in Parsons, 
1995, p. 470). Sabatier (1999) stresses how implementation takes place 
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in a policy subsystem where implementation coalitions are driven by 
deep, near-core and secondary belief systems. Values, beliefs and 
culture are therefore crucial, and ideological constructions of the 
'problem' are important. Discourse, then, is an essential aspect of 'the 
politics of labour activation'. Geldof (in Heikkila, 1999, p. 17) 
describes labour activation as a social discourse with divergent 
ideological roots. Hvinden (in Heikkila, 1999) argues that some labour 
activation discourse has latent functions, including political 
management of unemployment and legitimation of public expenditure 
cuts. Discourse also functions to legitimate sanction-based welfare 
reforms. There is a gender dimension to the discourse of labour 
activation, with lone parents in particular being vulnerable to negative 
stereotyping (Murphy, 2008). 
The politics of labour activation extend beyond formal political 
institutions into the politics of implementation, which takes place in 
the domain of unelected power. Parsons (1995, p. 469) argues that 
implementation requires a specific interpretative element and the 
crucial application of discretion. Lipsky (1971, as cited in Parsons, 
1995, p. 468) describes street-level bureaucrats as workers who use 
discretion to implement policy and therefore shape policy. 
Implementation processes are structured by bottom-up negotiation 
and consensus building. Trade unions, as workers' representatives, 
have significant capacity to influence delivery of policy. This can be 
contrasted to representatives of users, who have less capacity and 
influence (Larragy, 2010). This draws our attention to who is involved 
in shaping, implementing and monitoring labour activation (NESC, 
2011). 
The political discourse of labour activation, 1980-2010 
This section reviews the discourse of labour activation from the early 
1980s to the contemporary crisis and identifies shifts in labour 
activation discourse from a hostile job-search discourse in the 1980s to 
a more supportive discourse in the 1990s; while discourse was more 
muted in the Celtic tiger period, it has shifted back to a more hostile 
discourse over this current crisis. 'Job search' was the byword for 
labour activation in the 1980s. In 1986 a Fine Gael Minister for Social 
Welfare, ideologically inspired by US workfare, piloted 'job search' -
a strong sanctions-led model of labour activation (Bond, 1988). A 
national Job Search Programme with a strong element of compulsion 
was then launched by a new Fianna Eiil Government in March 1987. 
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Bond argues that the primary objective of Job Search was 'policing the 
welfare system' to tackle 'widespread allegations of fraud' (1988, p. 
200). Only 1.2 per cent of those interviewed as part of the programme 
were disallowed their unemployment payment but public relations 
spin misled the public that up to 10 per cent of claimants were 
associated with fraud. Thus 'labour activation' policy was instrumental 
in the political management of high 1980s unemployment: the 
unemployed were blamed for unemployment and the government was 
perceived to be doing 'something' about unemployment. 
It was introduced in the face of campaigns by the Jesuit Centre for 
Faith and Justice, various unemployed action groups and the newly 
formed Irish National Organisation of the Unemployed (INOU), and 
there was no engagement of client groups in the implementation and 
monitoring processes. Resistance and institutional turf wars occurred 
within the newly formed F As, driven largely by political actors and 
institutional insiders, as dominant senior managers from AnCO were 
oriented towards training rather than unemployment.2 Trade unions 
resistant to implementation were driven by their perspective of !he 
impact on working conditions of trade union members i~ F AS. 
Industrial relations negotiations to change work practices to 
accommodate Job Search interviews were resolved by agreeing a 
policy that placement officers would only interview people outside 
their own locale. This worked against the practice of placement 
officers having effective local labour market knowledge, needed for 
successful job placement. The negative discourse and poor 
implementation of this labour activation programme left a lasting 
legacy in the eyes of claimants: they logically questioned th~ va~ue 
of such low-quality training and suspected the state's mot_Ivat~on 
and capacity to deliver future meaningful labour act1vat10n 
interventions. 3 
In between crises there is evidence of an ideational struggle in the 
mid 1990s (Larragy, 2010). Labour activation discourse ~n t~e 1990s 
was dominated by a discourse of 'sensitive labour actiVatiOn' and 
2 FAS was formed in 1988 as a merger of the National Manpower Service, the Youth 
Employment Training Agency and AnCO - the industrial training authority An 
Chomhairle Oili(ma. 
3 This legacy gained notoriety in a Rita Ann I-Iiggins poem, whicl~ spoke of 'talking into 
a banana on a job search scheme' (Higgins, 1986, p. 112). Th1s 1mage referred to a 
widespread urban myth about FAS using bananas to train people in telephone skills m 
Job Search programmes. 
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'supportive conditionality', behind which advocates of voluntary and 
compulsory labour activation battled to shape labour activation in 
national and local social partnership institutions. In 1994 the National 
Economic and Social Forum (NESF) published its fourth report, 
Ending long-te1m unemployment. This framed Irish labour activation 
discourse towards a more supportive style of delivery and 
recommended establishment of Local Employment Service Networks 
(LESNs) in disadvantaged areas. An advocacy coalition led by the 
INOU worked to shift discourse about unemployment (INOU, 1997; 
Larragy, 2010). They were aided by an international context framed by 
the EU Delors White Paper on Social Policy (1994), but also by civil 
servants from the Department of An Taoiseach and a new Department 
of An Tanaiste, who acted as policy brokers to mitigate the power of 
the economic ministries. The ideational battle continued through 
1996's social partnership negotiations, where the Irish Business and 
Employers Confederation (IBEC) allied with economic ministries to 
promote a harder, mutual-obligations labour activation agenda. 
IBEC's agenda overlapped with emerging evidence of skills and 
labour shortages and fears that the unemployed would not take up 
newly created jobs; it mirrored a focus on conditionality in the 
OECD's Jobs study (1994). Public rhetoric about fraud and abuse was 
fuelled by the Irish Small and Medium Employers Association's 
labelling of the unemployed as 'course junkies' and 'social misfits'. 
After protracted negotiations, the social partnership agreement 
Partnership 2000 for inclusion, employment and competitiveness 
(Government of Ireland, 1997) was published, and it contained Clause 
3.3, which stressed the 'reciprocal obligation of the unemployed' to 
take up reasonable offers of work and training. Like the discourse of 
the 1980s, the associated text included reference to tackling fraud and 
abuse. A competing voluntary discourse was reflected in policy 
rhetoric that was strategically ambivalent and promoted both 'sensitive 
labour activation' and 'supportive conditionality'. 
By 1998 the focus shifted to the new EU Open Method of 
Coordination (OM C), which framed the discourse oflabour activation 
and required each EU member state to report on a NEAP. The 
language promoted a preventive strategy of 'systematic engagement' 
with persons at an early stage of unemployment through focused, 
targeted interventions. Over the course of the Celtic tiger, 
unemployment fell and labour shortages were managed through 
migration policy rather than labour activation policy. In 2005 the 
NESC published the Developmental welfare state and challenged 
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complacency by placing 'labour activation' on the agenda. Inspired by 
the Danish model of flexicurity, it argued for greater synergy between 
income supports and active labour market measures. While generally 
well received, the NESC's argument that Celtic tiger Ireland 
maintained a stubborn 20 per cent of the working-age population as 
welfare dependent had little policy impact. Various factors accounted 
for muted discourse of labour activation over this period. Overall 
culpability lay in the absence of political leadership and policy 
ambition in the 2002-2007 coalition government. The path-dependent 
nature of government departments meant the DSP was preoccupied 
with administering income supports and the Department of 
Enterprise, Trade and Employment was more oriented towards wider 
labour market policy and labour market shortages. There seemed little 
interest in releasing the productive capacity of unemployed people, 
perhaps reflecting an underlying conservative social policy and a lack 
of faith in human capacity based on the belief that the poor would 
always be with us and that inequality was inevitable. Saris et al. (2002) 
note in Celtic tiger Ireland a revived 'culture of poverty' argument, 
where 'unhappy social and market outcomes are connected to 
perceived deficits within populations and individuals as distinct from 
using social exclusion analyses to link unhappy individual outcome 
with structural factors'. They argue that 'a triumphalist celebration of 
success suggests that those being left behind are simply feckless' (Saris 
et al., 2002, p. 186). 
F As and employer groups allied to import labour and shied away 
from the more difficult challenge of activating reserve domestic labour 
through an adequate labour activation strategy. Absent also were 
conspicuous champions for labour activation among the social 
partners. Claimants' representatives, remembering 1980s Job Search 
and sceptical about NEAP labour activation experience, doubted the 
capacity of the state to implement 'intelligent labour activation' 
(Sweeney, 2011). A 2006 report, Proposals for supporting lone parents 
(Department of Social and Family Affairs, 2006), containing ambitious 
labour activation and reform proposals, while welcomed was treated 
cautiously in practice, with many questioning the capacity of the state 
to integrate service delivery or develop appropriate childcare 
provision implied in the report. Anti-poverty advocates focused more 
on welfare adequacy. Using policy space opened up in the EU OMC 
social inclusion strategy, they successfully embedded social welfare 
adequacy targets into social partnership national wage agreements 
and, in a revenue-rich environment, exploited political opportunity for 
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increased welfare payments m Fianna F<'til electoral budget cycles 
(Cousins, 2007). 
That period was characterised by a lack of politics of labour 
activation, and Ireland entered the 2007 crisis with a social welfare and 
labour activation policy largely unreformed from the 1980s and clearly 
unfit for purpose (Sweeney, 2011, p. 3). International Labour 
Organization (ILO) data showed that unemployment soared from 4.4 
per cent (110,000) in early 2008 to 14.7 per cent (315,000) in late 2010 
(NESC, 2011, p. 19). By then, the government and the troika had 
agreed a Memorandum of Understanding, which includes a labour 
activation strategy focused on social protection modernisation and 
reforms towards a 'working age' payment subject to a more intense 
form of labour activation and conditionality (DSP, 2010).4 The new 
Minister for Social Protection introduced the language of 'lifestyle 
choice' and 'social contracts' into debate on 17 July 2011, and her 
ministerial colleagues have echoed a relatively consistent and hard 
message that appears fuelled by an understanding of labour activation 
as a disciplinary reaction to a perceived welfare dependency. Kerrigan 
(2012, p. 1) states that the Irish Taoiseach 'Kenny and his like can't 
help seeing unemployment as a lifestyle choice'. Labour activation is 
also consistently linked to 'combating fraud' (NESC, 2011). Consistent 
with the 'mutual obligations' strategy, there is a stress on 'messaging', 
with the discourse aiming to make people anxious about being long-
term unemployed (Finn, 2011). Media discourse reflects a growing 
emphasis on deserving and undeserving poor. Unemployed people 
have been negatively stereotyped in various documentaries on TV3 
and RTE and in the broadsheet and tabloid press (Connolly, 2012; 
Harford, 2010). The NESC (2011, p. ix) observed the government's 
tendency to overassociate incentive to work, fraud, control and 
contract messages with labour activation policy, and warned against 
the 'convenience' of exaggerating fraud or welfare lifestyle. 
The politics of implementation, 1980-2010 
This section reviews the implementation of different versions of 
labour activation. It begins by reviewing the introduction of supportive 
labour activation strategies in the 1990s, then looks in more depth at 
implementation of the NEAP in the 2000s and ends by considering 
-l The troika refers to the International Monetary Fund (IMF), European Central Bank 
and European Commission. 
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implementation challenges for the National Entitlement and 
Employment Services (NEES). 
Much of the 1990s revolved around institutional battles over who 
would implem~nt labour activation policy. The 1992 Culliton report 
argue? that F AS .be split into separate training and unemployment 
agencies (Industnal Policy Review Group, 1992). Despite strong 
support for such reform (including from IBEC), F As resisted plans for 
total restructuring and maintained the two functions within a new 
intern.al divisi?nal structure (Boyle, 2005). A large part of FAS's 
capacity to resist reforms came from its direct access to EU Structural 
Funds. Its capa~ity to disperse this funding regionally gave it a political 
rel~~a~ce that 1t nurtured through developing strong links with local 
pol~t~Clans across parti~s (Boyle, 2005). In spite of this, cross-party 
pohtrcal proposals to divest the unemployment functions of F As to 
the DSP_persisted throughout this decade (Boyle, 2005, p. 41). They 
were resisted by the DSP, which perceived F As to be somewhat of a 
'poisoned chalice'. Instead, the DSP bypassed FAS and initiated a 
number of innovative back-to-work ~nterventions, and also reformed 
some wo~ki.ng-age ~elfare payments. The politics of implementation 
of LESN IS mformatlve. First mooted by the 1994 NESF report Ending 
lm!g-term unemployment, LESN was introduced in response to 
evidence that FAS's mainstream services were not reaching the long-
term unemployed in disadvantaged areas. Many believed F As could 
not implement a positive and supportive form of labour activation and 
lobbied for such a pilot 'demonstration' model outside FAS. There 
followed an institutional struggle over implementation, with tension 
between locating it firmly in the local development infrastructure and 
achieving some measure of integration in local delivery or leaving it as 
a stan?-alone (Larragy, 2010). Pm1nership 2000 negotiations agreed 
extensiOn of LESN to all designated partnership areas but LESN was 
not ~ntegrated into l_ocal development (Larragy, 2010, p. 153). 
Crucially, LESN had httle programmatic capacity and F As retained 
control of the main Com~unity_Employment Programme. Eventually, 
LESN was folded back mto F AS governance in March 2000. While 
LE~N. and b~ck-to-work initiatives produced supportive labour 
activatiOn pohcy, the net result was also a duplication of labour 
activ~tion infrastructure and an increasingly fragmented and complex 
pubhc empl~yment service (Forfas, 2010; Grubb et al., 2009). 
Recogmsmg such weakness and the continued institutional 
~o~pe~ition o~er labour activation policy, the 1998 EU OMC required 
mst1tut10nal hnkage between the Department of Social Welfare, the 
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Department of Enterprise, Trade and Employment, and FAS. Under 
EU employment guidelines, each had to develop and report to a 
common NEAP, which included systematic engagement through a 
focused, targeted intervention for each unemployed person who had 
been on the live register for more than six months. Over the years 
1998-2002 numbers of unemployed claimants who appealed decisions 
to withhold benefits on grounds of failing 'availability' or 'genuinely 
seeking work' tests rose significantly. The Social Welfare Appeals 
Office (2001, p. 8) saw appeals for loss of payment increase by 1,700, 
or 47 per cent, in 2000, suggesting an intensification of conditionality; 
almost half the appeals were upheld, suggesting some overzealous or 
unreasonable application of conditionality. By 2006 all unemployed 
claimants of all ages were required to voluntarily engage with F As. 
Failure to do so could lead to payment review and it was proposed to 
extend this process to lone parents and people with disabilities. 
General unemployment fell sharply in the early 2000s, as did long-
term unemployment. At first glance, the NEAP labour activation 
appeared successful and early optimistic evaluations suggested it was 
cost -effective- Ireland appeared to be on the road to labour activation 
(Indecon, 2005). 
However, all was not well: declining unemployment was replaced 
with a growth in numbers on lone parent and illness or disability 
payments, and there was a stubborn working-age welfare dependency 
(NESC, 2005, p. 53).5 Despite the EU NEAP framework being in 
place, the mid-2000s labour market and skills shortages were not 
managed by 'labour activation' of those of working age but through an 
expanded migration policy. More rigorous evaluations (Grubb et al., 
2009) questioned the effectiveness of the NEAP. McGuiness et al. 
(2011) went further and found it to be counterproductive, with people 
being 17 per cent less likely to find employment after having been 
through the NEAP These evaluations point to the folly of assuming 
that forcing the unemployed to be 'activated' will somehow translate 
into employment outcomes. Ireland is not the only example where 
compulsory labour activation decreased job prospects (Allen, 1998, p. 
211). McGuiness et al. (2011) found that less than half the target 
5 Lone parents' allowances covered 95,611 beneficiaries in 1993 (10 per cent of all 
assistance payments) but 206,241 in 2002 (26 per cent of all assistance beneficiaries). 
Disability had grown likewise from 38,643 ( 4.4 per cent) in 1993 to 83,562 (10.8 per cent) 
in 2002. Unemployment assistance covered 448,614 (51.3 per cent) in 1993 but 125,959 
(16.2 per cent) in 2002 (NESC, 2005, p. 47). 
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group was actually called into the labour activation intervention and 
that actual intervention was a one-off with no follow-up interviews or 
actions and no subsequent requirement to remain active. Various 
reasons lie behind this design and implementation failure, including 
the general lack of data or information sharing and of broader 
cooperation between F As and the then Department of Social Affairs. 
The NESC (2011, p. 173) points to poor management, inadequate IT 
systems, low expectations of service users and less-than-effective use 
of sanctions. 
This revenue-rich period was a missed opportunity for much-
needed structural reforms to resolve structural blockages, enabling 
transition from welfare to work, many of which were a prerequisite for 
good labour activation.6 Despite rich opportunity, little reform took 
place and Ireland entered the crisis in 2007 with a social welfare and 
labour activation policy largely unreformed from the 1980s and clearly 
unfit for purpose. In Sweeney's words, 'Irish public employment 
services entered recession under-examined, fragmented and lacking in 
ambition . . . they were passive and low intensity in character ... 
increased demands were amplifying these weaknesses' (2011, p. 3). 
From 2008 the social welfare system had to manage a surge in 
applications for welfare support, and priority shifted to administering 
claimants' payments in a time frame that avoided social unrest. 
Likewise, in F As, pressures on employment services meant slippage in 
NEAP targets for labour activation interviews and a stalling of its 
planned extension of these interviews to lone parents and people with 
disabilities. Training resources were restructured into shorter-duration 
courses of variable quality and relevance (Harford, 2010; NESC, 
2011). FAS was also rocked by a series of corporate and governance 
scandals (Comptroller and Auditor General, 2010). Restructuring 
F As seemed not only inevitable but imminent. In March 2011 the new 
Fine Gael/Labour Government agreed to establish a NEBS, which, by 
integrating the DSP's income-support function and FAS's public 
employment service function, would be the framework for a new 
approach to labour activation. The training division of F As will be 
integrated into SOLAS (National Education and Training Agency), 
housed in the Department of Education and Skills. In July 2011 the 
DSP launched a framework to merge community welfare officers 
6 Reforms include those on affordable childcare, poverty traps for larger families, rent 
supplement, unemployment traps, child income support, family income supplement, 
treatment of atypical work, etc. 
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employed by the Health Service Executive and public employment 
services officials employed by F As into a fully integrated NEES (DSP, 
2011 ); the original 2012 target for NEES to be fully operational is 
unlikely to be met. As Boyle observed about earlier reform processes, 
'zero basing was an institutional impossibility' (2005, p. 100). There is 
a core challenge in merging three separate organisational cultures, 
and how this is done is important. Street-level bureaucrats will have a 
significant bearing on how labour activation is ultimately implemented 
(Parsons, 1995). Industrial relations negotiations play a potentially 
significant role in shaping the local delivery of labour activation (albeit 
front-line workers may not feel adequately engaged in such 
negotiation processes). The NESC (2011) advocates ambitious labour 
activation but appears sceptical about the state's capacity to 
implement reform in this policy area (NESC, 2011). 
Analysis 
What can we learn from this potted history of the politics of labour 
activation? It is helpful to disaggregate policy processes into three 
discrete independent variables- 'interests', 'institutions' and 'ideas'-
the combination of which actively determines the pace and direction 
of policy change in any policy community (Hay, 2004, p. 204). This 
section analyses the institutions, interests and ideas central to the 
politics of labour activation. Policy community refers to institutional 
spaces and ideational processes where actors in advocacy coalitions 
with a common policy focus use a shared language to discuss and 
bargain about policy ideas (Boyle, 2005, p. 19; Sabatier, 1999). 
One agency dominated the various institutions concerned with 
labour activation policy in Ireland. Resignation of Rody Molloy as 
Director of FAS in November 2009 focused attention on the lack of 
corporate accountability of F As, but there has been less focus on its 
lack of policy ambition in relation to labour activation (Kirby & 
Murphy, 2009). Boyle (2005) reflects how FAS thrived by becoming a 
Swiss army knife - 'able to do many things but none of them 
particularly well'. One area where it did thrive was in accessing 
investment in ALMPs through EU Structural Funds and social 
funding. The NESC (2011) observes the paradox of significant 
expenditure on ALMPs (a key component of labour activation) 
without an overall labour activation framework. Instead of labour 
activation, F As provided an intensive service in local constituencies, 
and in turn F As achieved political protection and immunity from 
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scrutiny (Boyle, 2005, p. 42). The DSP is relatively weak in the 
hierarchy of government departments but it controls a significant 
proportion of public expenditure and income support and thus a key 
part of labour activation policy. Its successful management and 
operational delivery of millions of weekly and monthly welfare 
payments have distracted from other policy functions, including labour 
activation. The DSP is under significant pressure to 'deliver' in a 
clientelist political culture where local politicians act as the broker 
between the state and citizen, and senior staff are often preoccupied 
with answering local political queries and national parliamentary 
questions relating to individual welfare files - this limits policy 
capacity. While the department developed statutory organisations for 
some policy functions, it never developed significant labour activation 
policy capacity. Although the EU OMC opened up the labour 
activation agenda, it also made for a more complex, fragmented 
policymaking process that, in Irish political culture, lent itself to policy 
procrastination. 
A large part of the failure to drive labour activation was due to a 
three-decades-long turf war between F As and the DSP and weak 
political leadership in resolving this institutional fault line (Murphy, 
2008). When imposed from above through the OMC, cooperation was 
still minimal, as commented on in several evaluations of the NEAP 
(Government of Ireland, 2005). The net result was that Ireland 
remains at least a decade behind institutional reforms that merged 
income supports and employment services in most OECD countries 
(NESC, 2011). Other institutions have no implementation role but are 
important ideational and coalition-building spaces. These included the 
NESF and partnerships based in local areas but most of all the NESC, 
which drove the Developmental welfare state vision of flexicurity and 
active social policy but which could not influence senior department 
civil servants who had capacity for implementation. Post-crisis policy 
activity has shifted from social partnership to the political arena, albeit 
with some less-powerful forms of social dialogue or consultation 
remaining. Internationally, the arrival of the troika in 2010 was to 
fundamentally change Irish politics. 
What of the ideational construction of labour activation in Ireland? 
The relatively humane Irish labour activation discourse has much to 
do with a more consensus-oriented political culture that tends towards 
a 'softer and gentler' language or at least a more rhetorical style of 
political discourse. All these actors coexist in an Irish political culture 
that stresses consensus and pragmatism and avoids extremity, so 
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discourse tends to be minor and incremental with few radical 
challenges from either the left or right for structural reforms (Cousins, 
2007, p. 70). The discourse is relatively subtle and at times strategically 
ambivalent so institutions can simultaneously be members of opposing 
coalitions. They draw selectively on sympathetic analysis in 
international organisations, amplifying analysis that reinforces their 
particular position. 
Wilson argues that when framing debate about unemployment it is 
important to differentiate people with weak attachment to the labour 
force from people with a lack of willingness to work. The problem is 
not individual but caused by the vulnerability of certain groups to 
macrostructural processes in the larger society and economy and the 
individual's social environment (Wilson, 1992, p. 651). Cruddas & 
Rutherford (2010) argue that the pattern in the UK has been for 
government welfare reforms to identify the poor as responsible for 
their own unemployment and poverty. Recent Irish discourse about 
unemployment feeds into this pattern (Kerrigan, 2012). Two crises 
framed this case study of the discourse of labour activation. There is 
evidence that the agenda of labour activation in a time of crisis has 
been about managing the politics of unemployment (Bond, 1988). In 
both the mid 1980s and early 2010s there is visible use of 'labour 
activation' as a political discourse to legitimate government responses 
to unemployment and to shift blame from government to individuals. 
As The Irish Times ('A wakeup call', 2011) observed on an unrelated 
matter: 
the language of political discourse matters. It is a measure of the 
acuteness of divisions in society, a mirror to the nature of politics 
and it helps shape the climate in which debate occurs. It sets the 
confines of the discussion and implicitly whether intended or not 
the limits of the acceptable. 
Finn (2000), however, accepts that 'discourse' is an inevitable part and 
parcel of labour activation strategy, where strong 'messaging' plays a 
preventive role in 'moving on' people with alternative options. He 
estimates that strong signalling or motivation and threat effects can 
encourage up to 10 per cent of the claimant count to engage in ex ante 
behavioural changes to avoid having to participate in labour activation 
programmes (Finn, 2000). However, such discourse leads to 
unemployed people being perceived as dishonest and lazy, and it leads 
unemployed people (especially those with least alternatives) to think 
MARY P. MURPHY 
and incremental with few radical 
right for structural reforms (Cousins, 
tively subtle and at times strategically 
mltaneously be members of opposing 
ively on sympathetic analysis in 
llifying analysis that reinforces their 
ing debate about unemployment it is 
c with weak attachment to the labour 
·willingness to work. The problem is 
e vulnerability of certain groups to 
larger society and economy and the 
(Wilson, 1992, p. 651). Cruddas & 
he pattern in the UK has been for 
identify the poor as responsible for 
Jverty. Recent Irish discourse about 
>attern (Kerrigan, 2012). Two crises 
course of labour activation. There is 
Jur activation in a time of crisis has 
s of unemployment (Bond, 1988). In 
W10s there is visible use of 'labour 
~ to legitimate government responses 
1me from government to individuals. 
all', 2011) observed on an unrelated 
mrse matters. It is a measure of the 
:ty, a mirror to the nature of politics 
:: in which debate occurs. It sets the 
j implicitly whether intended or not 
1t 'discourse' is an inevitable part and 
:gy, where strong 'messaging' plays a 
people with alternative options. He 
Jr motivation and threat effects can 
e claimant count to engage in ex ante 
ing to participate in labour activation 
owever, such discourse leads to 
1ed as dishonest and lazy, and it leads 
hose with least alternatives) to think 
The politics of Irish labour acti\'atioll: 1980 to 2010 43 
that labour activation programmes are designed to catch them out 
rather than support them. Given the fact that unemployment causes 
mental ill-health and damages self-esteem, the body politic needs to 
exercise caution in this regard (Kinsella & Kinsella, 2011 ). Claimants 
can internalise the stigma associated with negative political discourse 
and are demoralised by such negative messages (Uttley, 2000). Such 
discourse can be ultimately counterproductive: it can legitimate more 
ruthless labour activation interventions that, ironically, may actually 
lead to more, rather than less, social exclusion (Dwyer, 2010). 
Consistent with the thoughts of Geldof & Hvinden (in Heikkila, 1999), 
the NESC is wary of the latent functions of labour activation 
discourse. 
While labour activation has never been a direct political issue, 
unemployment has significant electoral salience. Politicians who want 
to be seen as effective in managing unemployment have clear 
motivation to talk tough about labour activation; opposition 
politicians are more likely to adopt a softer discourse. Clearly, unions 
have power as direct representatives of workers who implement labour 
activation and, until recently, as key policy actors in social partnership. 
Unions had direct impact on the design of Job Search in the 1980s and, 
in the context of industrial relations mediation concerning NEES, are 
a crucial factor determining the design of future labour activation 
policy. Employers also have an interest in labour activation and have 
much to lose or gain depending on the specific design and 
implementation of labour activation; compulsory registration of 
vacancies with public employment services is likely to be resisted by 
employers but free traineeships welcomed. NGOs representing 
claimants have had influence as direct lobbyists, social partners and, in 
some instances, experts in the field of welfare-to-work policy, but their 
position as social partners is now considerably weakened. Boyle (2005) 
identified loose groups of actors and institutions in two competing 
policy coalitions promoting different visions of the future of F As. 
Likewise, it is possible to identify coalitions based on ideologically 
informed variations of labour activation, one focused around 
voluntary participation and the other on more conditional labour 
activation. These interact with different international policy spaces. In 
one group we see specific government departments and agencies, 
employer and economic policy advocates, various bankers, economists 
and business commentators. They are primarily associated with key 
policy discourses, including expenditure controls, competitiveness, 
maintaining work incentives and tackling fraud, and are more likely to 
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associate or engage with OECD/IMF, the World Bank, multinational 
corporations and ED-LISBON. Another group included over time 
statutory agencies and NGOs more oriented towards social policy, and 
they are more likely to advocate on anti-poverty, equality, rights, 
supportive conditionality and sensitive labour activation, and to 
associate with EU OMC, UN/ILO and EU NGOs. 
Power has shifted over the decades in question and, in some 
respects, has come full circle. In the 1980s the initiative clearly lay with 
the political parties, while the 1990s and 2000s saw more focus on 
social partnership. The 2010s have clearly returned politics to the 
driving role, albeit in the context of loss of economic sovereignty and 
the shift of power to international actors, both formally in the soft 
power of the OMC and the harder power of the troika but also 
informally through policy and ideational influence and multinational 
corporations' lobbies on labour market policy. The timetables and 
reporting structure agreed with the troika have impressed a keen sense 
of urgency about reform that is rarely seen in the Irish labour market 
or social policy, but the strict austerity and schedule of cuts in public 
expenditure make it all the more challenging and difficult to 
implement that reform agenda. 
Conclusion 
Different labour activation agendas have stalled or been inadequately 
implemented as a consequence of the actions of vested interests 
working within coalitions. These defensive vetoes often diverted 
labour activation up 'cul de sacs' (Finn, 2011). There have been some 
successful offensive attempts to promote labour activation, including 
establishment of LESNs and introduction of back-to-work allowances 
in the 1990s. Larragy (2010, p. 130) identifies 'a reversal of fortune' for 
this offensive coalition as unemployment waned and actors moved to 
other policy agendas. Often the policy agenda was driven by short-
term populism and the clientelistic ambitions of Fianna Fail, who 
offered political protection to core agencies (in this instance, F AS) as 
long as they delivered locally and on key short-term political 
objectives. The norm therefore was policy drift where decisions are 
caught in a 'policy paralysis' and, in Esping-Andersen's (2003) words, 
a 'frozen landscape of reform'. 
Three clear lessons can be observed from this short review: the first 
concerns the importance of political discourse; the second, 
implementation; and the third, the relationship between the two. As in 
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the 1980s, the present agenda is driven from the political seat and 
tough talk about welfare reform appears part of a broader political 
strategy to manage the crisis and legitimate the government in the face 
of such high unemployment. Negative construction of labour 
activation as a control measure, however, may have the unintended 
consequence of indirectly derailing or stalling Irish labour activation. 
This is particularly so because labour activation is a policy area 
sensitive to those with capacity to block its micro-implementation. The 
government is clearly serious about implementation of institutional 
reform. However, path dependence matters, and zero basing is an 
institutional impossibility (Boyle, 2005). Just as AnCO could strongly 
influence the future of FAS in 1988 (Boyle, 2005), FAS can strongly 
influence the emergence of the NEES in 2012. There are clear 
ambiguities between and within different departments' understanding 
of labour activation. Given that the politics of labour activation is 
informed by and carried out in the full glare of the troika, the frozen 
landscape of welfare reform is likely to thaw and 'cui de sacs' are less 
likely. However, in the context of lack of resources to fund positive 
labour activation, it is more likely that negative and punitive forms of 
labour activation associated with cutbacks and control agendas will 
develop. This is not the best starting point for implementation, and is 
likely to be politically unpopular from the perspective of at least 
two key groups with capacity to exercise vetoes. Claimants' 
representatives, while open to positive labour activation, are 
understandably defensive about the timing and context, and remain 
unconfident in the Irish state's ability to deliver effective or 
meaningful labour activation (NESC, 2011 ). As the NESC argues, a 
national client council and wide engagement with client representative 
groups are necessary to develop a balanced labour activation strategy 
in consultation with all stakeholders. Trade unions directly 
representing workers may also veto policy that associates members too 
much with 'control' agendas. If labour activation becomes politically 
unpopular, given the Irish capacity for vetoes, policy drift and policy 
implementation disorder, it is possible, even with the presence of the 
troika, for Irish labour activation to be postponed again or highly 
sabotaged in the micro politics of implementation and delivery. 
Recalling Sabatier (1999), values, beliefs and culture are important 
underlying features of implementation coalitions. The ideological 
construction of the 'problem' of unemployment and understanding of 
labour activation have a direct bearing on implementation. It is in the 
interest of both the state and the unemployed that discourse about 
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labour activation contributes to a public understanding that 
unemployed people can contribute positively to economy recovery. 
The labour activation message should be supportive, rather than 
negative, about unemployed people. Given the previous absence of 
political leadership and administrative policy ambition, it is crucial 
to demonstrate faith in the capacity of unemployed people by 
investing in quality 'high road' labour activation. As Hardiman (2011) 
observes, a debate about values is necessary. A social contract is 
necessary. The state needs to deliver on its contract with citizens. The 
real challenge is not activating people but activating the state to 
implement a meaningful labour activation strategy that enables social 
inclusion (NESC, 2011). The recession makes introducing activation 
and the NEES all the more challenging but also all the more 
necessary. 
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